

R. Haaren. THE
SENTIMENTS
OF A
DUTCH
PATRIOT.

Being the

Speech of Mr. V* H** N

In an august ASSEMBLY on the present
State of AFFAIRS, and the Resolution
necessary at this Juncture to be taken for
the Safety of the REPUBLIC,

Faithfully translated from the DUTCH ORIGINAL.

*Non ea vestra ingenia sunt, ut ipsi aliis vi oppressis imperia
teneatis; sed in eo magna sunt vires vestrae, ut alium potiri
principatu prohibeatis, aut potum exturbetis.*

Orat. Demosthen. ad Athenienses.

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P R E F A C E.

*I*F it was possible to exclude, from such as are entrusted with the Administration of Government, those Passions and Prejudices to which human Nature is subject, one might hope to see either well regulated Monarchies or free States subsist for ever. It is not because such Forms of Rule are contrived, but because they are executed by Men, that they moulder and crumble away to nothing. It seems, at first Sight, hard to give a Reason for this; but consider, Reader, attentively, and you will find the Reason is already given. When Men sit down to plan out Schemes of Government, they commonly divest themselves of Passions, and draw all Things according to the Dictates of Public Spirit; therefore such Institutions are excellent. But the Execution of these fine Projects falling into the Hands of the ordinary Race of Mortals, Men of weak Parts, and strong Passions, who, instead of considering Government as an Invention, calculated to render Many happy, by the Industry and Integrity of a Few; suppose the Few, by being in the Management, have a Right to make the most they can of the Many; and thus the very best Constitutions in the World are first weakened, and, at length, ruined. A very short System this, and yet, God knows, it includes the Secret of Modern Politics.

The Antients, who are esteemed wiser than we, thought they could never be too grateful to Legislators. They believed, the bringing Men to live in Society, to submit to Laws, and to renounce that wild Kind of Liberty they derived from Nature, was a Sort of new Creation; and therefore they honoured as Gods, such as had a Power of operating, for these salutary Purposes, on their Fellow Creatures. Horace, in the very best of

his Performances, sets all this in the fairest and finest Light to Augustus ; probably, with a View of engaging him to restore the Roman Republic, which he had certainly done, had it not been first for his own private Views, and then for Livia's. The Remarks of Horace are admirable, though, if that was his Scheme, they proved unsuccessful. But, what could a Poet do, where Pompey, Cato, and Brutus, failed ? He shewed, that such Benefactors to their Species were very justly reputed more than Men, after Death ; but Augustus was set upon being the first of Men while living ; and therefore could not be persuaded to restore Liberty to the Commonwealth, though he should be deified for it, by the Men of Sense ; and like Romulus and Numa, have his Name handed down to Posterity as a Legislator ; which, however, had certainly been more honourable than that of Emperor ; and the Apotheosis that would have attended it, more authentic than the Senate's.

We have, long ago, lost these Sort of Godlike Men, who studied the good of others, and employed their Thoughts and Cares to save Men from Men, and to derive them all the Advantages of Government, exempt from its Inconveniencies. Yet they have been succeeded by another very useful and honourable Race of Men, who (though rarely) appear, even in our Days, and are distinguished by the Appellation of PATRIOTS. There are many Ranks, Titles, and Characters, amongst Mankind, but none that comes near this : All others imply Matter of Benefit resulting to the Person who enjoys them ; whereas this signifies a Man who blesseth his Brethren, and is capable of receiving no Satisfaction, but the Divine one, of being conscious he acts right. An Author who lately wrote the Lives of the De Wittes, in English, expresseth his Sense of their being, as well as affecting to appear Patriots, very strongly ; he says, He looks upon it as his greatest Felicity, that he had lived to pay a just Tribute of Praise to their Memories. This is talking of Patriots, in the Language of Patriots, spoke by so few People, that one can scarce consider it as a living Tongue ; and therefore cannot be much amazed to find it not generally understood. But, for all this, the Few, in all Countries, are capable of discovering, admiring, and applauding it.

It is to Them the following Pages are consecrated ; to the Lovers of Truth and Virtue, of Public Spirit and Liberty. Here breathes the honest, upright, and disinterested PATRIOT, who feels for his Country, not Himself ; who aims at inspiring Counsels

P R E F A C E.

v

Counsels of General, not Private Utility ; who deals fairly and freely with all Characters, and shews Approbation, or Dislike, as they tend to benefit, or to dishonour, his Country ; who is equally incapable of concealing or dissembling his Sentiments, but treats the great Affairs of Europe with the same Franchise and Implicitness, as if he discoursed only of Family-Concerns. He has no Complacencies, no Reserves ; what he thinks, he says ; complains with Warmth, as well as blames with Freedom ; assembles in a very narrow Compass all the Facts, all the Reflections, necessary to his Purpose ; and, with great Strength and Perspicuity, so ranges them, that they throw Light upon each other, and make the whole Discourse a perfect Demonstration. It is impossible to read, without discerning this ; and tho' we cannot be so thoroughly Masters here of certain Facts, as the People are in the Country for which it was calculated, yet we know them sufficiently to apprehend the Justice of his Deductions, and to be convinced by the Solidity of his Reasoning,

By force of Custom, and some other Reasons I don't care to mention, we are in Britain grown out of Love with set Speeches, and fancy nothing can strike or persuade, but sudden and unpre-meditated Harangues. Yet, notwithstanding this Prejudice, I fancy (if it has had no Wrong done by its Translator) this Speech will make its Way, and, perhaps, restore some Degree of Credit to that Manner of Speaking. This will be found far enough from being long, and farther still from being tedious. There is something exact, but nothing dull or tiresome in the Method : It has Fire, as well as Order ; and tho' the Whole is grave and serious, like its Subject, yet sometimes there are very quick Strokes of Raillery, and a very lively Turn of Humour. But the most valuable Thing in this (as it ought to be in all Speeches) is the Bent, and the Design of it ; not to serve the Speaker, not to give Weight to, or support, the Purposes of any Party ; not to outface Truth with sophistical Arguments ; but to remove Prejudices, to recal public Spirit, to excite in his Countrymen those Virtues necessary to save their Country ; to awaken that generous Passion for universal Liberty, which is the very Essence of the Virtue we commend, which dissolves the narrow Ties and Connections of particular Countries, and intitles the PATRIOT to universal Reverence and Applause.

T H E

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S P E E C H
O F
Mr. Van HAAREN.

THO' this seems, to me, a Season fitter for Acting than Speaking, and tho' I am satisfied, that we have lost much, by neglecting the former for the sake of the latter ; yet, I am for once determined to follow the Custom of those I condemn, and trouble you with a Speech : A long Speech too ; which is a Thing not a little out of my Way ; and therefore I will begin it, by giving the Reasons which led me to make it. These are Three. The first, That I may lay before you at once my Sentiments of the whole Compass of your Concerns: The second, Because I perceive you are much affected by such Harangues : And the third, Because, for what I have to say, no Season is so proper as the present.

We have been for some Time suspended, as to our Hopes of arriving at a secure and solid Peace, by Means of a vigorous War, or of a well-conducted Negotiation ; and while we have endeavoured to compass our Ends, by a Mixture of both Methods, we have prosecuted neither with any good Effect. Our Barrier is lost, our Armies beaten ; still we make War. Our Mediation is rejected, our Propositions slighted ; yet still we treat. When you first ran this Course, I took a good deal of Pains to shew you, how contrary it was to Reason, and yet you would go on : Now, tho' Experience might convince you how far you have gone wrong, you seem still inclined to proceed. What can this end in ? I will not say what ; because tho' easy to foresee,

foresee, it would be irksome to hear; but I speak only to persuade, and not to chagrin; and therefore I shall content myself with shewing you it can never answer your Desires.

Our Entrance into the present War was neither from Motives of Interest or Ambition, but of Justice. We entered into it as *Auxiliaries*, in Performance of Treaties, made for the Safety and Support of the State; which can no longer continue a State, than while she performs her Engagements, and makes good her Treaties. We did no more, in this Respect, than *Great Britain*; only we were nearer, and our Performance of our Stipulations became more immediately necessary. We carried our Assistance farther, and engaged more deeply, by Degrees; but still in pursuance of Treaties; which Treaties long ago required us to act in Defence of the Empress Queen, with our utmost Force. This War was begun by *France*, to subvert the *Pragmatic Sanction*; and we are bound to act as Auxiliaries, till she abandons that Design. Thus the Cause, the End, and the Duration of the War, are as plain as we can desire.

As *France* began the War of her own Head, she might also have put an End to it when she pleased. We are not obliged by Treaties to assist in making Conquests upon her: but we are obliged to see her restore those Conquests she has made, in Breach of Treaties; by which *in foro Conscientiae*, she was as much bound as we. But we were bound by Interest, as well as Treaty: The *Pragmatic Sanction* did not more concern the Queen of *Hungary's* Power, than our Safety. Her Rights could not be defeated, but at the same Expence of Ours. So that Policy, as well as Piety, the Respect due to our Country, as well as to the good Faith of the Republic, required, as well as justified, all we have done. Did *France* dislike this? Did she unwillingly shed the Blood of her Neighbours? Did she wish rather to spare the Subjects of the State? She might have forced us to lay down our Arms, — by laying down her own.

While she declined this Method, while she continued the War, while she raised new Commotions every-where, while she pretended new Causes, as the old extinguished, while she attacked all our Allies, without Decency, as well as unprovoked, why should she exclaim against the Republic? Could we do less than we have done against her, if we

we consider Things in this Light ? But if we reflect how far her unjust Resentment has engaged her to treat us as Principals in the War, ought we not to have done more ? Was there any Road more open to Peace than making War without Reserve, and employing Force to teach Ambition Reason ? Did not the House of Austria do this for us in 1672. when attacked by the same Power, in a former hot Fit of political Phrensy ? Did not the Emperor and Great-Britain act the same Part towards us in 1702 ? Did not the first War save our Country, and did not the last give us our Barrier ? What doubts then could we entertain, that War must be pushed, until France put all Things again in *statu quo prius* ?

Had we listened to this Reasoning in Time (I say listened, because you know it was preached) the War had been at an End long before now. Had we armed effectually at once, and declared to what End we had armed, without Reserve, we had gained Credit, and done our Business. The Force we have since employed, would have covered our Frontier then ; and the Princes of the Empire, had they seen us hearty in our own Interests, would have followed our Example ; I mean, would have been true to their Interests, and not suffered their Territories to be overrun, and their Subjects ruined, without considering the Power that did it as an Enemy. But you lost that Occasion ; yet one thing you may gain from it : Suffer yourselves to see that you lost it ; — and repair your Error, by resolving to embrace the next Opportunity ? You are indeed *Auxiliaries* still ; but, as *Auxiliaries*, you may be as effectually undone by the War as if you were *Principals*. This makes the Matter equal. Carry on the War effectually either Way, you are safe : But, if you will not carry it on effectually, don't carry it on at all. You will then be undone indeed, as a *State*, — but private Persons will save their Money.

But let us now consider, what you have done, by Way of Negotiation, for restoring Peace. You had not now such a Minister at Paris, as *Van B*---- who could use Statesmen, Courtiers, Beaux, Priests, and Mistresses, to serve his Masters, from whom the Bosoms of his Counsellors, and the secret Drawers of the Grand Monarch's Cabinet, were not safe, if they held Things dangerous to the Republic,

lic. But the Concerns of your Country were in the Hands of a *Galliciz'd Dutchman*, one who spoke the Language of *Versailles*, and represented the Best of his Countrymen, as no better than himself ; one who studied to make his Court there, by representing you more timorous than you were, at the same Time that he laboured, by his Epistles to yourselves, to make you what he had thought fit to represent you. This eloquent Framer of slavish Addresses mistook all your Instructions, and murdered all the Memorials he had Orders to present. Instead of expostulating, he whined ; instead of shewing why you granted Succours, he apologiz'd for it : Yet, which is equally strange, continue him, and the War.

When, with much ado, you were brought to act with some Vigour and Spirit, you sent again to the Most Christian King, as it were to deprecate his Anger. Some other Steps you took to pacify *France*, and to mingle, what cannot be brought to join, a Spirit of Kindness, and of Resentment. You did all this, without Question, from the best Principle in the World. You hate War heartily, and this you sent Minister after Minister to tell your Enemy. This raised the Spirits of the *French Ministry*, who thought your Troops would behave wondrous meekly in the Field, when your Ministers publickly complimented their King upon his coming home from knocking their Brains out. There was somewhat in this so irreconcilable to the Dignity of a free State, that some of the old Ministers could not believe these Speech-Makers came from the same Country the Plenipo's did, at the Conferences at *Gertruydenburgh*, where they treated the *Gallic Statesmen* very Cavalierly. This odd and fantastical Counter-pace of War and Peace, at a Time, has hurt you exceedingly ; it has discouraged your Soldiers, distressed your Subjects, alarmed your Allies, made the rest of the World smile, and your Enemies despise you.

Yet you cannot say, that it has produced any of the good Effects that you expected, or been attended with any one of the good Consequences you proposed. The very Design of the War, viz. the Ruin of the House of *Austria*, was of such a Nature as might well have justified you in declaring War upon it ; and, perhaps, if you had put your-
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selves in a Condition of doing, and had threatened it, your Minister, intrusted with the Message, had been better treated than the Parasite *V-- H----*. But, though content to act as Auxiliaries, you made an Excuse for that, as if you sent your Wishes one Way, and your Troops another. Your Barrier, however, was attacked with peculiar Violence, though the Business might as well have been done another Way; those Fortresses were not only taken, but absolutely ruined; your Troops forced to scandalous Capitulations, and afterwards worse used, the Benefits of the last Treaty of Commerce taken away; and so many other Indignities offered you, that barely to report them is an insupportable Burden to a free Mind. Yet on you have still went; *Versailles* was crowded with *D--ch* Ambassadors; and where, in former Times, we sent Couriers, you now sent Ministers, who were hardly better read.

This Humour of negotiating in the Midst of a War, will appear still more *mal-à-propos*, if you advert to the Conduct of your Allies. When the Storm first broke upon *Germany*, and her Majesty the Queen of *Hungary* and *Bohemia* found herself deprived of one Capital (*Prague*), and obliged to leave another (*Vienna*) in order to remain in some Degree of Safety at *Prestburgh*, you never heard of her supplicating for Peace, or sending Minister after Minister to offer Terms. On the contrary, she applied herself steadily to the defending what was left; and relied, for Security, on her Forces, and her Allies. Yet, her Condition was, at that Time, humanly speaking, much worse than ours; and, had she been so inclined, such Applications had been far more excusable. But she knew there was no making them, but by betraying her own and the Common Cause; and therefore, even in her greatest Extremity, she publicly declared they should stand or fall together. This Firmness in a righteous Cause, procured her immortal Glory, infinite Resources, and, by the Blessing of Providence on her Arms, perpetual Success.

Reasons of the same prudential Nature, in regard to Trade, and some others, which have been sufficiently manifested, might have furnished an Apology for the *British* Nation, had she acted less vigorously. But, in the first Place, she forced the *French* to declare War, which the
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Loss of *Cape Breton* has made them repent; and, since that Declaration of War, no Intercourse, till very lately, and by our Procuring, has there been between the two Nations. This, you plainly discern, has not been from the Credit of any particular Ministry, but from the bent and frowardness of the People, vexed at every Disappointment, murmuring at eveay Relaxation; and continually pressing the most vigorous Measures, as the only safe and sure Means of coming at an honourable Peace. They see plainly, that *France* has an Advantage from every Delay; draws in new Allies, whenever the Confederates draw Breath; and that, to put an End to these Evils, we must crush the evil Spirit.

As to the heroic Monarch of *Sardinia*; his Wisdom, Courage, and Fidelity, are the Admiration of our own, and will be celebrated in latest Times. He was Proof, in the Beginning, against all Threats and Temptations; took the Part that became him; and has remained fixed to it through all Fortunes. *France* hath sent many Ministers to him, who have returned *re infecta*; and thereby raised his Glory on the Ruins of their own Reputation. He has been reduced almost to his Capital, and his Troops have been scarce strong enough to cover it from a Siege; but even This could not reduce him to treat, much less to send his Ministers Post. The Common Cause has entirely occupied his Heart, and his Affections: If it prevailed, he knew himself secure; but he knew also there was no Security without it. His conduct would be a pleasing Theme, if it were not inimitable. A Government divided like ours, into many Hands, cannot come up to one administered by the best, the bravest, the greatest, of Men: But, however, his Example should encourage us; since it shews, that Virtue, Integrity, and a good Cause, are invincible Things. So our Ancestors thought, and knew; and so, if it be not our own Faults, may We.

The *French* are wise and able Politicians (otherwise why would we fear or imitate the *French*?) and you see how they made and managed a War, when they once thought fit to fall into it. They were weary of growing slowly great, of augmenting gradually their Strength, and taking Time to become more powerful than their Neighbours: A

avourable Opportunity offered, and they embraced it. Immediately Negotiations were set on foot, and Alliances concluded. She wanted Friends at that Juncture, and she bought them, without haggling for the Price. By this Step *France* had Customers enough ; and those who came at the latter End of the Fair were bought Dog-cheap. But she was ready for War, before these Treaties were well made ; her Armies entered *Germany* on the very Heels of her Ambassadors ; they had scarce told Princes she was their Friend, before her Troops made them sensible she was also their Mistress. There was not much of Decorum, it is true, in all this ; but there was abundance of good Sense. What they did might be wrong, on the Whole ; yet thus far they managed right.

But the *French*, who are wise and able Politicians, did more than all this : They had a very bad Cause, but they boasted of it for all that. Ambition dwelt in their Hearts, but Justice was ever in their Mouths. They broke Treaties from equitable Motives, and attacked the Fatherless, out of pure Regard to the good Cause, which got the better of Tenderness and Compassion. You stared and trembled at this ; but some of your Writers took the Courage to expose their Conduct. Still *France* was not ashamed : She complained to you of those saucy Scribblers, that had the Impudence to speak unseasonable Truths ; and covered her own Cause with such plausible Pretences, that many People here began to doubt, whether Breach of Faith was a Crime, or whether Treaties were binding according to the Letter or not. The Power of *France*, while it carried all before it in *Germany*, got the better of common Sense in *Holland*. When *Lintz* was taken, we began to recover our Wits : As soon as we saw the *French* were not omnipotent, we made no Scruple of questioning their *Omniscience*.

Yet the *French* were wise and able Politicians, though they lost their Game, from their Fear of risking too much. They pushed very far, but not far enough : They uncovered their Country, they exhausted their Treasures but they did not send their last Man, and their last Stiver, into the Empire. The great Legislator of *Germany* could not execute his Plan without them ; and from this they failed. It is very true, the *French* failed ; and, after wasting an hundred

hundred Millions, for the Destruction of the House of Austria, had only the Pleasure of distressing her for a few Weeks ; and then the Marshal was shut up in Prague, who was to have treated a Peace on the Ramparts of Vienna. But how came the French to make this false Step ? These wise and able Politicians, do They Err sometimes ? I don't say that.—No, I always admire the French !—They were very prudently mistaken, and miscarried by being excellent Politicians.—Shall I tell you how ?—They would not believe Van Hoey, they could not conceive you would behave yourselves as you did.

If the Ministers of the Most Christian King had attentively considered what an immense Expence this War would draw after it, they, perhaps, had never entered into it : But, had they gone roundly through with their Undertaking, and poured in all their Troops and Money at once into Germany, they had executed their Scheme, and spent less than the War has now cost them. But one Campaign they reckoned on ; and, being out in that Computation, they began to retrench, and, consequently, to lose Ground. By this Means their great Project evaporated, their Allies were undone, and France reduced to think of saving Herself, and getting something for her Trouble. A great Fall this, from directing all Europe, to guard against all Europe ; from making Emperors, to behold Emperors made in spite of her ; from giving Law to Kings to receive it from them ; and from humbling one great Power in Germany, to become dependent on another. Yet this we must own is the Case, and the plain Effects of not acting with Vigour, in the right Place, and at the right Season.

From the Time, however, they embraced this new System, they have acted exactly right, and have pushed where they were like to succeed best by pushing. Their ablest, their most fortunate General, their oldest and best-disciplined Corps, their matchless Train of Artillery, all are employed in the Low Countries. Their Magazines are filled in the Winter, their Regiments recruited, their Schemes concerted, nay, sometimes executed, in that Season, which others will have an absolute Season of Recess. Always active, always provident, whatever becomes of other

other Armies : This we see is always superior, at least, if not complete. They pursue here one uniform Plan, and execute it Step by Step, though every Step is foreseen by Friend and Foe : Foreseen, alas ! but not prevented. The favourite Marshal is as absolute as his Master ; he knows what he wants ; demands, and is supplied.

After this Manner a War is carried on with Success. It is not Plans concerted at the Close of one Year, and the Troops that are to execute them drawn together in the midst of the next, that will prevail. It is not mature Deliberation; a nice Calculation of Quota's, a scrupulous Regard to Oeconomy, that will do ; these may be right in civil Concerns, but, in military, other Maxims should take place. Those who are to act, should be trusted to contrive ; we must do not only what is fit, but what is necessary : Our Frugality may be seen in our Houses, but ought not to be practised in the Field. There are Seasons for all Things. War is a Tempest none would raise ; but, when we are in it, we must be governed by it. We must lay our Account with some Inconveniences, which we had better impose on ourselves, to some good Purpose, than stay and suffer them to be imposed on us by Necessity. Had we acted ever so vigorously, the Troops of the Republic had not suffered more than they do now ; had we entered France after *Dettingen*, our Soldiers had kept Garrison — where they are now Prisoners.

For, let me entreat you to consider the past and the present Condition of all these Powers. Have not we seen the French, and their Allies, literally, at the Gates of Vienna, and are they not now driven out of Germany ? But by what ? By Prayers, Treaties, Negotiations ? No, by Arms, Resolution, and a glorious Contempt of Danger. Have we not seen the French Colours waving in Britain, an Army of desperate Highlanders advanced into the Heart of that Kingdom, and a numerous French Army, ready to be wasted over to its Coasts ? But what then ? Did this extort an Ambassay ? Was it thought a Warrant for private Negotiation ? Nothing like it. The British Nation provided for her own Safety, and carried on her military Operations by Land and Sea. Her Credit, and what Wonder ? was somewhat disturbed at Home ; but for all that, which is truly

truly a Wonder, she punctually fulfilled her Engagements abroad, and her Allies were equally benefited by her Assistance, and edified by her Example. The Dispute lasted long, and the last Struggle was sharp; but the Good Cause prevailed, and the Tools of *France* were overcome: So they have been in *Italy*, and the poor Remains that have passed the *Var*, seemed reserved to teach their boasting Legions never more to dream of conquering that Country. Disappointed at *Coni*, harrassed at *Alexandria* and *Tortona*, beaten, when inspired by Despair, at *Placentia*, ruined at *Rotto-Freddo*, and flying ever since, they proclaim to the World this Truth, that they never prevail where they are heartily opposed; and that the first Step to beating the *French* is, not to fear them.

Let this Lesson, at last, be learned by us. These mighty Conquerors have entered every-where by Treachery, and have been expelled by Force—except in the *Low Countries*. There, assuredly, will their Laurels be next blasted, if we once take up this Precept, and lay aside Fear, which sure so many Examples may well teach us. This is the first, this the only Maxim we want, all the rest will follow of Course; and when our Freedom is once fixed, and our Glory restored, we shall wonder, that so easy a Thing was so long neglected. But there is no Time to spare, no Measures to be kept. You must lay aside all Treaties, but those for taking Troops into your Service; and, that you may the more readily incline to this, I shall shew you two Things, most clearly. The first is, that you must be undone by any Peace that is concluded at present: The next, that one Campaign, made in earnest, will fix the Freedom of *Europe*, and your Liberties.

There are none, who have any Acquaintance with the Affairs of *Europe*, but must know, and confess, that the tearing from the House of *Austria* the Possessions she inherits from the House of *Burgundy*, has been the great View of *France*; and, for preventing which, our Neighbours have often interposed. It would take up too much Time, to shew by how many different Methods, and under how many several Pretences, this has been attempted for a Century past: And therefore let us only reflect on the four last general Wars, which, whatever might be given out, were,

at the Bottom, all calculated to bring this about ; viz. those of 1672, of 1689, of 1702, and of 1741. Something was done towards completing this favourite Scheme in each of the three former, but more than in them all has been done in this last ; and we know, that till their Affairs were ruined in *Italy*, the *French* looked upon the entire Conquest of the *Low Countries* as the Work but of one Campaign more ; and in Truth, as Things have gone, they had but too, too much Reason to expect it. I need not tell you, that, this once done, we should cease to be, and *France* would speedily become, a Maritime Power.

There is another Thing, no less known and certain. *France* never concludes one War, but with a View of entering upon another, for which she wants specious Reasons. Be so just to yourselves, therefore, as to reflect whether, at present, you have any Hopes of seeing *France*, out of her boasted good Will to this State, the last Proof of which, at *Liege*, was very convincing, relinquish, absolutely, all her Acquisitions on this Side. The Negative is very certain. You received it but the other Day from her Plenipotentiary quite naked, and without so much as the gause Covering of Compliment, which to the *French* is so cheap a Manufacture.

But if they are to retain Any, let them keep All, We shall be the safer for it. I say, let them keep All ; for we can never sleep sure with the Knife at our Throats ; but perhaps we may, if it is laid upon the Table, that is, if *France* keeps a Part only of her late Conquests, by Treaty. She will not then fail to magnify her Tenderness and Modesty ; her Partisans will raise the same Notes still higher, and all the Rabble of *Gallicized Dutchmen*, which, God knows, are but too numerous, will be dead drunk with *French* Moderation. Do but figure to yourselves, what notable Security we shall have, when we are in this hopeful Situation, and while *France* is at work in preparing for the last Scene, which you may be sure will be very short.

Do not fancy I take Things for granted, purely to terrify and affright you, though in Lethargies we sometimes take great Liberties with our Friends : The Case is really so, your own Conduct proves it. Why did you bear so long with *France* ; why look on her Irruptions into *Germany* so tamely, why administer Assistance so slowly to your

your Allies? You were deceived. *Van Hoey* and all his Sister Nurses, fairly sung you to sleep. Why, as the Danger grew nearer, did you not stir; why when excluded the Benefits of Peace, did you not declare War; why, when this haughty Power treats you with peculiar Indignity, do you, in Return, make new Overtures, new Submissions; as if it were a Trial of Skill between us, whether *You* have most Patience, or *She* most Pride? Is it not because you are afraid of her Power? And will you be less afraid when she has more Power, and is a nearer and more formidable Neighbour? Will your Fears cease in the same Proportion they ought to rise? or are we really so phlegmatick, that, in order to raise our Courage, it is necessary to drive us to Despair? If you chuse Negotiating rather than Fighting now, what will you then? At present you rely more on your Plenipotentiaries than your Generals; but you will then have little Use for either. You would be glad to see the French out of Brussels, Antwerp, and Ostend; but would that secure you from seeing them there again? Is not your Frontier exposed, let them be ever so distant? Your Barrier, is it not ruined as well as lost? Has not the Behaviour of France, during the last War, made a double Security necessary? You cannot draw it from the having those Places restored, which are destroyed. From whence then can you have it? By humbling the Power of France; and, instead of trusting to a perpetual Neutrality, securing your further Safety by a perpetual Alliance, which may replace your Barrier, and remove your Danger.

At the same Time that you see how desperate your Disease has grown, by your not apprehending, or not attending to, your Danger, you see the only possible Remedy; see it within your Reach, and, as far as human Wisdom can discern, see that it will be still effectual. When France began the present War, she was indeed terrible. She broke into Germany with numerous Armies, and she had charmed the Germans themselves into assisting towards their own Destruction. But all this drained her, both of Blood and Treasure; and she was so sensible of her Loss, as gladly to repass the Rhine. In Italy her Lot has been the very same; fatal Battles, and fruitless Sieges, have brought her Forces low in Reputation, as well as Numbers. Here, in the Low Countries, Fontenoy was a

Victory that cost more than it was worth : *Liege*, too, cost very dear, and was worth nothing. Suffer yourselves therefore coolly to consider the Thing, and you will plainly see, that tho' it is a Giant you are going to engage, yet it is a Giant that has run his Race ; run himself out of Wind, and has much ado to stand upon his Legs. The Picture may be coarse, but it is like.

When this unhappy War first began, the good Lord *Stair*, who remembered the Maxims in Use, when Fighting was in Fashion with us, always insisted, that *France* could not maintain herself at once on the *Rhine*, and in the *Low Countries*. Experience has shewn this to be very true ; but if she could not do this in her full Strength, how shall she do much more when her Strength is so much less ? The present Invasion of *Provence* demands Half her Force ; and, at the same Time, deprives her of a great Part of her Resources. If we form a good Army in our own Territories, and the Allies enter *Lorraine* with an Army of an Hundred Thousand Men (which, if we are frugal enough not to stint our Subsidies, may be done), the *Low Countries* are recovered. It may be without a Siege ; to be sure, without a Battle. An open Country is very soon won ; and the *French* may speedily learn, that, in destroying our Barrier, they ruined their own. This once performed, I will not say, we may treat a Peace, à la *Belle Isle*, on the Ramparts of *Paris* ; but we may surely prescribe to her just Terms, when entering her Territories on each Side with superior Forces.

This is not the fine-spun Scheme of a professed Statesman, but the plain Sense of an honest Patriot. I am not an inveterate Enemy of *France*, a Creature of the Court of *Vienna*, or an Instrument of that of *London*, but a downright *Dutchman*, concerned for the Safety, and zealous for the Freedom, Welfare, and Glory of my Country. I propose to you nothing that is dark, dangerous, or impracticable ; but what is dictated by your Interests, and requisite in your present Circumstances. You have now no other Choice to make ; you have no more Time to lose. The Whole is before you, and All is in your own Power. You have shewn sufficiently how much you are afraid of being made a Province of *France* ; and therefore we have a Right to expect you should be ready to do whatever appears necessary

necessary to prevent it. If These are your Sentiments, this is your Road, this is your Time; and you will no longer hesitate about what must be done to prevent your being undone. You seem to be affected with what I have said, and this encourages me to go on.

First, then, mind but One Thing at once. Lay aside Negotiating, which, you find, does nothing; and prepare for the sole Thing that will do; a vigorous, and, which is of no less Consequence, an early Campaign. Instead of equipping new Plenipotentiaries for *Versailles*, let them repair to the Courts of the Empire: You will find them willing enough to spare you Troops; and, in the mean time, you may recruit and augment your own. If your Generals ask Forty, give them Fifty Thousand; you will save Money, and spare Bloodshed, by saving a Campaign; and, besides, your Example will be a Law to your Allies. Is the Money wanting? Raising Troops will raise that. Let a Subscription be made on the Back of your Declaration of War, and in Three Days it will be full. Have you any Doubts about your Allies? This is the surest Way to remove them. Take this Step, and they will take any Step you please. Are you apprehensive of French Resentment? This will set you at Ease. Be you but once just to yourselves, and *France* will resume her Respect. Do you arm, and she will very soon treat.

But do nothing by halves. Resolve what will content you, and stick to that. Be sure, that, as soon as you shew yourselves in earnest, a Thousand Arts will be tried to take you off. If these make any Impression, all is lost. I do not absolutely say, you should refuse all Terms; but this I say, That you should fix them with your Allies, and listen to nothing till they are granted. You may then treat if you will. But, if you should avoid it till something material is done, it would be still better. All Negotiations retard Business. Time to *France* is All: Give her That, she will recover her Strength; or, at least, she will find some Way to cover her Weakness. Before she can do this, is the Juncture of Success. Let the Courier from *Lorraine* meet the Courier from *Provence* at *Paris*: Nor would it be amiss, if you furnished Matter at the same Instant for an Express from *Brussels*. We have had a vast deal of bad News by One Post here at the *Hague*; let

to see if our Neighbours can bear it better; for sure we may justly say, By this Time it is their Turn. We have been disturbed, let *Them* be disturbed too.

It is evident, from the last Campaign, that *France* is not invulnerable, but that in some Parts she may be hurt. Let us exert ourselves this Campaign, and we shall be satisfied she is not invincible, or her Propositions always unintelligible. If we do but deal roundly with her, she will, in Return, deal plainly with us. Our Field-Marshals will, I dare say, prove our best Plenipotentiaries; and the Drums and Trumpets in our Army be the first Music that proclaims Peace.

I have taken up much of your Time — but, I hope, to some Effect. The Eyes of *Europe* are upon us: Our Allies are at a stand, till we take some Step: Our People eager to see the Credit of the Republic revived, and her Troops at Liberty. Take then at once a Resolution worthy of your Ancestors, your present Circumstances, the Confidence reposed in you by your People and Allies, your own Fame, and the Approbation of Posterity. Take it, and be confident the Success will be answerable to the Cause: For remember it is an Appeal to GOD; and that the GOD of *Justice* is also the GOD of *Battle*.

6 AP 58

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